Talk of chemical weapons in Sudan’s war has moved beyond he-said-she-said. Since fighting began in April 2023, there have been accusations of the use of chemical weapons.
A recent New York Times investigation pushes the story further. Based on what the paper describes as nearly 150 documents, photos, videos, audio recordings, and thousands of messages, it alleges an organized effort inside the Sudanese military to develop chlorine-based munitions.
Independent.ng has tracked similar claims throughout the conflict, including repeated warnings about civilian protection and attacks on critical infrastructure.
Evidence of a Program, Not Just an Incident
The NYT dossier points to months of work in 2024 to produce chlorine-filled munitions. Key details cited:
Documents name Brigadier General Tariq Hussein as a lead supervisor. They describe a munition combining explosives with large amounts of chlorine, and tests before scaling up.
Correspondence reportedly refers to about 300 munitions manufactured at one point.
Most troubling, part of the chlorine is said to have come from a water-treatment plant in Omdurman. That’s in a city already facing collapsed services, cholera outbreaks, and severe water shortages.
Independent.ng reported earlier this year on how vital facilities in Omdurman have become pressure points in the war.
If true, this is not just repurposing a civilian chemical. It’s taking a substance meant to protect public health and turning it into a weapon.
This isn’t the first claim. Over the past two years there have been other reports, and the U.S. formally concluded that the Sudanese Armed Forces used chemical weapons, imposing sanctions as a result. Independent.ng noted at the time that without independent verification, such accusations can also be used in the information war. Now you have battlefield accounts, journalistic work, a U.S. position, and an internal dossier the NYT says it verified.
The Chain of Command Question
In cases like this, responsibility rarely stops with who built or dropped the munition. The question is how high the knowledge went.
The documents, according to the investigation, suggest senior military leadership was aware, including army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. A program needing materials, facilities, transport, aircraft, testing, and storage is hard to explain as a rogue officer’s project.
More serious are references to orders from al-Burhan to erase traces of the program after U.S. pressure and sanctions increased.
Why Chlorine Counts and What Happens Next
Calling it “chlorine” can make it sound less serious than sarin or mustard gas. It isn’t. Chlorine has legitimate uses in water and industry, but using any toxic chemical as a weapon violates the international ban on chemical weapons. Civilian availability is exactly why it’s attractive in war: easier to get, harder to track.
Sudan is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. With credible evidence of manufacture and use, the case now calls for an urgent, independent international investigation with access to sites, documents, and people.
The NYT report is not a court ruling, and journalism cannot replace investigators. But it provides names, dates, locations, and materials that can be tested.
The question is no longer whether this deserves investigation. It’s why a comprehensive, independent probe hasn’t started yet.
Chemical weapons cross a line the world has tried to hold for over a century: no poisons on the battlefield. If that line can be crossed in Sudan without accountability, the damage isn’t only to Sudan. It’s to the idea of the red line itself.
